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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, . . 
Plaintiff-Respondent, . . 
-v- . Case No . 18083 . 
ZOLLA HALES, . . 
Defendant-Appellant. . . 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Zolla Hales, appeals from a 
conviction of wilfully destroying public records in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Zolla Hales, wa? charged with 
wilfully destroying public records over which she had custody 
in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-412 (1953), as amended, 
a third-degree felony. On the 20th day of August, 1981, the 
appellant was found guilty of the charge by a jury. After 
referral to the Adult Probation and Parole Department for a 
pre-sentence investigation report, the appellant was sentenced 
to eighteen months' probation and $1,000.00 in fines. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction and 
judgment pronounced below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appell2nt, Zolla Hales, was charged with 
wilfully destroying tbe Elk Ridge town financial records in a 
fire occurring on or about February 11, 1980. 
The appella~t servea as the Elk Ridge Town Recorder 
from December 1976 until January 1980. She was authorized to 
have personal custody of the financial records in her home 
since the town had no depository facility in which to house 
the records. Her duties incluaea the receipt, recording and 
disbursement of Elk ~idge town funds (T. 20). From 1977 until 
April, 1970 the appellant's husband served on the... Elk Ridge 
City Council. In this capacity he was authorized to counter-
sign checks drawn on pJblic funds issued by the appellant (T. 
20). 
Following tje announcement of her resignation in 
Nove~ber, 1979, the ap?ellant was to prepare the financial 
records for audit ana ~ransfer to the succeeding recorder (T. 
21, 22). The transfer s~ould have occurred when the successor 
took office in January, 1980. At the time of the fire on 
February 11, 1980, the appel~ant still had not transferred the 
records to the auditor. The appellant's successor never 
received any financial records from the appellant (T. 32). 
-2-
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At trial the appellant contended that on February 
11, 1980, she completed the record for audit in front of the 
fireplace in their home (T. 99). Allegedly leaving the 
records on a metal chair near the fire, she said she left the 
home intending to run some errands and to deposit the 
completed record with the auditor in Spanish Fork (T. 35). 
About thirty minutes after she left the house she claimed she 
realized she had forgotten the records and returned to find 
them "engulfed" in flames leaping two or three feet high (T. 
29, 51). She then purportedly picked up the hot metal chair, 
protecting her hands with towels, and transported the 
conflagration through the house to the outside patio (T. 35). 
She then doused the flames with water and extinguished the 
blaze. The appellant's husband arrived from Orem after she 
telephoned him with the news of the incident. In an effort to 
have an authority "visualize" the incident, the appellant 
called the succeeding recorder and asked her to come and 
witness the aftermath and offer advice (T. 95). 
The state showed that the succeeding town recorder 
was persistently encouraged by the appellant's husband to sift 
through the debris and remove what was salvageable after the 
successor arrived at the scene {T. 109). Refusing to follow 
the Council member's directions because she felt someone in 
authority should examine the remains, the new Town Recorder 
suggested that the mayor be called. The appellant's 
-3-
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husband replied that he "didn't give a damn what anyone else 
thought and they could all go to hell as far as he was 
concerned" (T. 110). After repeated remonstration by the Town 
Recorder, the appellant's husband telephoned the town mayor 
(T. 110). The mayor notified the sheriff and county fire 
marsh all. 
The expert inspections that occurred 4 or 5 hours 
after the alleged fire indicated that there was no smoke odor 
or stain in the room or on its furnishings as would be 
expected after such a fire (T. 50, 66). There was no trail of 
debris or burns in the flooring along the path the appellant 
allegedly took from the fireplace to the patio outside (T. 
42). No evidence of burning or singeing was observed on the 
person of the appellant although she claimed to have carried 
the metal chair with the fire on it through the house (T. 52, 
63). Finally, there was substantial debris and evidence of 
burning outside on the patio where the fire was put out (T. 
48, 69). 
Steve Kennedy, the Utah State Fire Marshall with 
more than 25 years' arson investigation experience, examined 
the premises and remains on February 15, 1980 (T. 75). He 
testified that throughout his experience, no fire had been 
attributed to a spark going through a screen as appellant 
maintained (T. 81). Additionally, the Fire Marshall indicated 
that fires produced by sparks took hours to develop into 
-4-
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flame and cause a great deal of smoke before flames erupt (T. 
83). He also said the metal chair was not sufficiently 
damaged to have supported the heat from the fire that 
destroyed the records (T. 82); further, that the limited 
damage to the exterior of the ledger books, that portion that 
is hard to ignite, indicated that the extensive damage to the 
contents or pages of the records was unreasonable without the 
aid of an accelerant or flammable (T. 80, 81). 
J The jury found the appellant guilty of violating 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-8-412 (1953), as amended--wilfully 
destroying public records held in custody. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS REGARDING THE 
STRENGTH OF THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE DID NOT 
VIOLATE THE DEFENDANT'S FIFTH AMENDMENT 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
Following the presentation of evidence at the 
defendant's trial, the prosecutor commented on the basis and 
motive of the testimony of the defendant's husband: 
-5-
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Now with regard to Mr. Hales' testimony. 
He has not been accused in this case, 
he's not on trial, but he wasn't even a 
witness to the burning or the aftermath 
of the burning, the immediate aftermath. 
But yet he's the one who tells the story. 
His comment, and I quote, "I don't give a 
damn," to Terri Tuttle is more than just 
mere words. And I think we need to 
analyze his motive in testifying. 
(T. 128). After the defense made its closing argument, the 
prosecutor rebutted as follows: 
Now the testimony, really, if testimony 
it is regarding how it occurred, how the 
burning occurred, comes from the 
Statement of the defendant that you will 
have as an exhibit. She would be the 
only one to come in and say how it 
happened, because apparently her husband 
was not at home at the time, and yet he's 
the one who testifies as to what 
occurred. Now it seems to me the 
defendant's argument to you is asking you 
to absolutely disregard your senses with 
regard to who has proved what. I'm 
surprised that he made no comment on the 
issue of motive. That's strange. 
(T. 142, 143). The defendant maintains that these comments 
constitute an abridgement of her right to refuse to testify 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), held that: 
-6-
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••. the Fifth Amendment, ..• in its 
bearing on the states by reason of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either 
comment by the prosecution on the 
accused's silence or instructions by the 
court that such silence is evidence of 
guilt. 
Griffin at 615. 
The Supreme Court further developed the Griff in 
doctrine in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967): 
At the time of the trial, Art. I, § 13, 
of the State's constitution provided that 
"in any criminal case, whether the 
defendant testifies or not, his failure 
to explain or to deny by his testimony 
any evidence or facts in the case against 
him may be commented upon by the court 
and by counsel, and may be considered by 
the court or the jury." Both petitioners 
in this case chose not to testify at 
their trial, and the State's attorney 
prosecuting them took full advantage of 
his right under the State Constitution to 
comment upon their failure to testify, 
filling his argument to the jury from 
beginning to end with numerous references 
to their silence and inference of guilt 
resulting therefrom. The trial court 
also charged the jury that it could draw 
adverse inferences from petitioners' 
failure to testify. 
Chapman at 19. There is no question that the comments in 
Chapman violated that accused's Fifth Amendment rights as 
established in Griffin. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held: 
-7-
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We conclude that there may be some 
constitutional errors which in the 
setting of a particular case are so 
unimportant and insignificant that they 
may, consistent with the Federal 
Constitution, be deemed harmless, not 
requiring the automatic reversal of the 
conviction. 
Chapman at 22. The Supreme Court recognized the inherent 
danger of abuse of a harmless error rule; it therefore 
provided a high standard that must be met in order to invoke 
the rule. a "court must be able to declare a belief [that the 
error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman at 
24. 
Following Griff in and Chapman, the Utah Supreme 
Court has drawn clear interpretive standards addressing the 
distinction between prosecutorial comments constituting error 
and comments deemed harmless. In State v. Kazda, Utah, 540 
P.2d 949 (1975), this Court stated: 
It is not to be doubted that the 
right of a defendant not to testify in a 
criminal trial is a fundamental right 
protected by both the federal and the 
Ut~~ Constitutions. Its exercise should 
in no way prejudice him in the eyes of 
.the court or jury. He need give no 
reason; and there should be no concern as 
to his reason for not testifying. The 
simple and immutable fact is, that for 
what we accept as good and sufficient 
reasons, the privilege has been long 
established that comments concerning an 
accused's failure to testify, however 
adroitly disguised, may have the effect 
-8-
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of impairing or destroying the privilege; 
and that this should not be done. 
The other side of this proposition 
is: that the prosecutor, and the public, 
whose interest he represents, should and 
does have a right to argue the case upon 
the basis of the total picture shown by 
the evidence or lack thereof. If either 
counsel cannot voice a challenge to the 
effect of the total evidence, then one is 
made to wonder, what may he talk about? 
It is our opinion that it is not only the 
prerogative, but the duty of either 
counsel, to analyze all aspects of the 
evidence; and this should include any 
pertinent statements or deductions 
reasonably to be drawn therefrom as to 
what the evidence is or is not, and what 
it does or does not show. The 
prosecutor's comment under scrutiny here 
falls within the principle just stated; 
and he made no direct reference to the 
fact that the defendant had not taken the 
stand. 
This problem has arisen in sister 
states who have ruled that statements of 
the nature here involved are legitimate 
comments on what the total evidence does 
or does not show, and·are not violative 
of the constitutional right defendant 
asserts. 
Kazda at 951 (emphasis added). According to Kazda, the 
statements "The defense has presented no evidence as to why 
the defendant was out there. What was he doing out there?" 
were held not to be a direct reference to the defendant's 
failure to testify. Rather, they were an exercise of the 
obligation to present all the evidence, even though the 
comments' ambiguity might have impacted on the jury. 
-9-
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In reaffirming the duty and privilege of counsel to 
argue the whole evidence, this Court in State v. Eaton, Utah, 
569 P.2d 1114 (1977) added a new dimension to the Chapman 
decision as it applies in Utah. Not only must the Court be 
able to say that ·the comments were harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but it must be "clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt in that the result would have been the same" (Eaton at 
1116) in order to have harmless, non-prejudicial error. 
A final standard was developed in State v. 
Norneland, Utah, 581 P.2d 1010 (1978). This Court held that a 
jury instruction informing the jury that the defendant's 
failure to testify was not to be considered in the 
deliberations was advantageous, not prejudicial to the 
defendant. Quoting a Rhode Island case, this Court elaborated 
on the propriety of the prosecution's comments: 
In order that there be a violation of 
Griffin, it must appear that the language 
used by the prosecution •.• was 
manifestly intended or was of such 
character that a jury would naturally and 
necessarily consider it to amount to a 
comment on the failure of the accused to 
testify. 
State v. Jefferson, 353 A.2d 190, 198 (R.I. 1976}. 
A careful reading of the closing arguments in this 
case will show that the prosecutor's comments did not violate 
the defendant's Fifth Amendment right and ao not warrant 
reversal under the standards provided above (T. 127-129, 
131-132, 142-143). 
-10-
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The prosecutor's first comment was designed to 
discredit and weaken t~e testimony of the defendant's husband 
by emphasizing inconsistent evidence, providing the inference 
of a possible motive for the testimony, ana by noting a lack 
of basis for the testi~ony offered. Under Kazda, this 
argument is considered a public obligation or duty--a right or 
privilege which accompanies counsel in his responsibilities at 
trial. The same is true of the second contested comment. The 
defense's challenge "They haven't proved anything" (T. 132) 
which recurred repeatedly throughout the argument, was 
answered in the prosecution's final statement. The comments 
pointed out that the defense had only shown what was contained 
in the defendant's "Statement" and what was contained in the 
husband's testimony. The delicate balance of permissible and 
impermissible comment under Kazda was not breached by either 
of these comments. 
The implication of the first comment must be 
greatly extended to provide an inference that the defendant 
failed to testify. The second comment more easily is 
construed to amount to a comment on the defendant's failure to 
testify. This is only because of the proximity in the 
argument to the reference of what the defendant did provide. 
Acknowledgment by the reaf firnation of the husband's absence 
from the scene about which he testified cannot be considered a 
direct reference to the cefenaant's failure to testify at 
trial under Kazda. 
-11-
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Contrary to the defenaant's assertion, the verdict 
in this case aid not hinge on the prosecution's comments; 
there was substantial· evidence presented sufficient to sustain 
the conviction without the prosecutor's comments. The lack of 
evidence of fire in the home shortly after the burning was to 
have taken place, the great evidence of burning outside the 
home, the inadequate damage to the metal chair, lack of burns 
or singes on defendant's person, the high improbability of a 
spark igniting the records as the defense postulates, the 
theory of embezzlement providing a motive for the destruction, 
and the unreliability of the defendant's husband's testimony 
could have sustained the verdict without any argument by the 
prosecutor whatsoever. Eaton, supra. The defendant maintains 
that the testimony of the Utah State Fire Marshall, Mr. Steven 
Kennedy, is particularly representative of the weak evidence 
offered by the State; yet appellant noticeably fails in his 
brief to identify wherein the testimony is weak. Mr. Kennedy 
aaequately qualified himself as an expert in arson investiga-
tion with experience in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
the National Board of Fire Underwriters, and the State of 
Utah, totaling more than 40 years of arson investigation. His 
testimony and opinion was corroborated and unrefuted. There 
is no weakness in the State's evidence as the defendant 
contends. 
-12-
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What effect, if any, the comments had on the jury 
is relevant. It is highly speculative that the jury 
associated the statements as a possible reference to the 
defendant's failure to testify since even the defense counsel 
apparently failed to notice it when the comment was made. 
Defendant's failure to object is a clear indication that the 
comments in their context, tone, and tenor did not naturally 
and necessarily alarm the jury as to the defendant's failure 
to testify. Nomeland, supra. 
Moreover, any possible prejudice which might have 
been created by the comments was further minimized by the 
Court's instruction number 10: 
The defendant is not required to testify 
on her own behalf. The law expressly 
gives her the privilege of not testifying 
if she so desires. The fact that she has 
not taken the witness stand must not be 
taken as any indication of her guilt, nor 
should you indulge in·any presumption or 
inference adverse to her by reason 
thereof. The burden remains with the 
state, regardless of whether the 
defendant testifies in her own behalf or 
not, to prove by the evidence her guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
According to Nomeland, supra, this instruction enhances the 
defennant's position although she did not testify. 
Finally, the prosecutor's comments were presented 
with no intention to make an issue of, or reference to, the 
fact that the defendant did not testify. In the first 
-13-
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instance the comment was intended to discredit the defense 
witness. In the second statement, the intention was clearly 
to rebut the defendant's argument as to who had proved what. 
It is clear from the transcript that the prosecutor had no 
intention of developing an assumption of guilt by an inference 
that the defendant did not testify. The prosecutor's intent 
or lack of motive in making the comments is a relevant factor 
which may be considered by this Court in determining whether 
error occurred. Nomeland, supra; Jefferson, supra. 
In summary, since the prosecutor's comments were 
not direct references to the defendant's failure to testify, 
were not intended to naturally or necessarily prejudice the 
jury, and would not have changed the result of the case if 
left unsaid, there was no reversible error in their utterance. 
The prosecution fulfilled his obligation and duty to argue the 
whole evidence before the jury in making the comments. 
POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANN., §§ 76-6-504 AND 76-8-412 
(1953), AS AMENDED, IX) NOT PROSCRIBE THE 
.SAME CONDUCT; APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY 
CONVICTED UNDER THE APPROPRIATE STATUTE 
AND THEREFORE THE CONVICTION SHOULD 
STAND. 
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-6-504 
(1953), as amended, proscribes the same conduct as Utah Code 
Ann., § 76-8-412 (1953), as amended. Section 76-6-504 
-14-
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provides: 
(1) Any person who, having no privilege 
to do so, knowingly falsifies, destroys, 
removes, or conceals any writing, other 
than the writings enumerated in section 
76-6-503, or record, public or private, 
with intent to deceive or injure any 
person or to conceal any wrongdoing is 
guilty of tampering with records. 
(2) Tampering with records is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
section 76-8-412 states: 
Every officer having the custody of any 
record, map, or book, or of any paper or 
proceedings of any court, filed or 
deposited in any public office, or placed 
in his hanas for any purpose, who is 
guilty of stealing, willfully destroying, 
mutilating, defacing, altering, 
falsifying, removing, or secreting the 
whole or any part thereof, or who permits 
any other person so to do, is guilty of a 
felony of the third degree. 
If these statutes do proscribe the same conduct, or if there 
is doubt or uncertainty as to whether they proscribe the same 
or similar conduct, then the appellant is entitled to the 
benefit of the application of the statute proscribing the 
lesser penalty. State v. Shondell, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 
146 (1969) •. However, contrary to appellant's contention, the 
statutes on their face and in their manifest purpose address 
different offenses and correspondingly different conduct. 
A first general distinguishing feature is found in 
the titles of the statutes which describe the conduct they 
-15-
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prohibit. Section 76-6-504 is styled "Tampering with 
Records," while Section 76-8-412 is entitled "Stealing, 
destroying, or mutilating public records by custodian." 
Additionally, Section 76-6-504 is placed in the chapter of the 
Code describing fraudulent offenses against property. Sect ion 
76-8-412 appears in the chapter concerning offenses against 
the government. These first-glance distinguishing factors 
shed light on the divergent purpose of the statutes. Section 
76-6-504 protects the people of the State of Utah from the 
fraudulent tampering with records and writings generally, to 
provi<le a remedy for third persons harmed by the destruction. 
In contrast, Section 76-8-412 is designed to protect the 
integrity of the government. These general distinctions are 
developed and accentuated with a more specific examination of 
the statutes. 
Section 76-6-504 can be violated by any person, 
regardless of his capacity. Section 76-8-412 cannot be 
violated by anyone except a public official. In addition, the 
official must have a custodial obligation with respect to the 
records destroyed or mutilated. The importance of the 
person/officer and custodian/non-custodian distinctions are 
highlighted by the general purposes of the statutes mentioned 
above. Under Section 76-8-412, the inegrity of the government 
is the concern. This integrity cannot be violated except by a 
person who has become an agent for the government through an 
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official capacity. Further, the official must have custody of 
the record in order to focus the responsibility for the trust 
extended to the officer. No such concern for agency and 
responsibility is contemplated by Section 76-6-504. There the 
harm is to the public or third persons generally and therefore 
anyone may violate the statute. 
The mental element required under each statute is 
different. Section 76-6-504 requires a "knowing" state of 
mind for the act while Section 76-8-412 demands a "willful" 
intent. This subtle but important distinction is indicated by 
the definitions of "knowing" and "willful." A person acts: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his 
conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct 
when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A 
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, 
with respect to a result of his conduct 
when he is aware that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the result. 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-2-103. This significant distinction 
relates to the burden of proof required to convict under each 
statute. To show a "conscious objective or desire to engage 
in the conduct or cause the result" as required by Section 
76-8-412 is harder to prove than is an awareness "that his 
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conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result" a~ demanded 
by Section 76-6-504. To protect a custodian who may have 
knowingly destroyed ~ublic records without having the desire 
to cause the result of the mutilated documents, the statute 
requires a showing of wilfulness. Such a high burden of proof 
is not needed in Section 76-6-504 since that statute requires 
a showing of fraud to convict. 
The statutes pertain explicitly to differing 
subject matter. Section 76-6-504 proscribes the mutilation or 
destruction of "any writing or record, public or private." 
Section 76-8-412 deals with public records filed or deposited 
with a public official. The location of the record is 
significant. A driver's or business license is a public 
record or writing which is not deposited with an official. 
Since the government is not responsible for the housing of the 
document, the alteration of the license or destruction thereof 
does not reflect on the integrity of the government. In 
contrast, the government has an abiding interest in records 
kept in official custody, making this distinction substantial. 
Finally, a violation of Section 76-6-504 requires 
proof of the traditional elements of fraud, including an 
intentional misrepresentation, reliance, and some sort of 
detriment. Section 76-8-412 does not require such a showing. 
The interest of maintenance of government integrity in Section 
76-8-412 obviates the requirement of a showing of 
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some damage or harm. ~he destruction of a record by an 
official in custody of the record is sufficient in and of 
itself to warrant criminal action. 
These specific distinguishing characteristics in 
the statutes are very important. They are rooted in the 
general purpose of the statute. Clearly the most important 
distinguishing feature is the official custodial capacity of 
the actor. Such character distinctions are sanctioned 
elsewhere in the law; for example, a restricted person can 
commit crimes by conduct that would not constitute crimes if 
the conduct was perpetrated by an unrestricted person. Utah 
Code Ann.,§ 76-10-503 (1953), as amended. These 
classifications are justified for two reasons. First, a 
person can manifest his unwillingness to comport to the norms 
of society and therefore be restricted from some activities to 
reduce his burden of voluntary compliance. Second, a person 
may voluntarily assume a higher standard of care and duty 
toward the public. Here, the public has a right to rely on 
the assumption of the trust and enforces the right by making 
the acts by someone in official capacity in some instances 
criminal where they would not be criminal if done by a non-
official. The state interest outweighs the possibility that 
such character distinctions are discriminatory. 
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The distinguishing element of official custodial 
capacity was established in "the common law, fixed by the 
habits and customs of· the people." Tuscan v. Smith, 153 A. 
289, 294 (Me. 1931). An official custodian's scrupulous duty 
with respect to public funds and the record thereof was 
established in 1845 by the United States Supreme Court, where 
Justice McLean opined: 
Public policy requires that every 
depository of the public money should be 
held to a strict accountability. Not 
only that he should exercise the highest 
degree of vigilance, but that "he should 
keep safely" the moneys which come into 
his hands. Any relaxation of this would 
open a door to frauds, which might be 
practiced with impunity .... Let such a 
principle be applied to our postmasters, 
collectors of the customs, receivers of 
the public moneys, and others who receive 
more or less of the public funds, ..• 
United States v. Prescott, 3 How (U.S.) 578, 588, 589 (1845). 
Strict accountability requires the keeping of a public record 
of funds. 
The evident purpose is to prevent fraud 
and insure honest administration. The 
evil of permitting willfull destruction 
.of such a public record required by law 
to be kept is apparent. 
People v. McAtee, 95 P.2d 471, 473 (Cal. 1939). 
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Because of the numerous substantive differences in 
these two statutes, it is clear that they do not proscribe the 
same conduct. Accordingly, under Rammell v. Smith, Utah, 560 
P.2d 1108 (1977), the statute which most specifically applies 
to the facts will apply. Since the appellant was an official 
with custody of the record, and the jury found that she 
wilfully destroyed the record, the state applied the more 
appropriate statute ana the conviction should stand. 
The defendant says she fails to understand the 
rationale for the varying degrees of penalty proscribed by §§ 
76-6-504, 76-8-412, and 76-8-413, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as 
amended. Section 76-6-413 states: 
Every person, not an officer such as is 
referred to in the preceding section, who 
is guilty of any of the acts specified in 
that section is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Sections 76-8-412 and 76-6-504, discussed earlier, provide 
penalties of felony of the third degree and class B 
misdemeanor, respectively. Although Section 76-8-413 is not 
at issue on appeal, it may be helpful to outline the reasoning 
for the various penalties in the three statutes. 
A violation of Section 76-6-504 requires a showing 
of the elements of fraua, one of which is damage, and the 
evidence of some other wrongdoing. Presumably, a party guilty 
of violating Section 76-6-504 may be dealt with under the 
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penalty provisions provided by statutes governing the covered-
up wrongdoing or harm commensurate with the nature of the 
harm. Thus, the penalty for the cover-up is negligible since 
the destruction of a record becomes a minor part of the 
criminal activity warranting class B misdemeanor treatment. 
In contrast, the willful destruction of a public 
record held in trust by an officer can be prosecuted without 
the showing of any harm done to the government. No associated 
misconduct or deceit is necessary. The crime is the breach of 
the trust and possible loss of government integrity. The 
crime· therefore warrants the penalty of a third-degree felony. 
Finally, Section 76-8-413, which again protects the 
integrity of the government, is compared. This statute is 
identical by reference to Section 76-8-412 in all respects 
except the actor. So it is distinguishable in all respects 
from Section 76-6-504 as was Section 76-8-412 exceot for the 
..L 
capacity of the actor. The intense government interest in the 
records over which its officials have custody warrants the 
designation of class A misdemeanor for this statute. 
Additionally, violation of Section 76-8-413 necessitates some 
form of trespass, where a violation of Section 76-6-504 does 
not. These three statutes were carefully drafted to proscribe 
different conduct and should be applied accordingly. 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellant was not prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's statements to the jury at trial and the appellant 
was charged with a crime under the appropriate statute. There 
being no error below, the decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of March, 
1982. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
General 
EARL F. DORI US 
Assistant Attorney General 
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